I. Introduction
I argue in this paper that it is not a settled issue in Canadian law that copyright exceptions provided in the Canadian Copyright Act can be trumped by contractual agreement, and that a strong argument can be made that they cannot. I first frame the issue by discussing the increasing use of digital rather than print materials in academic libraries, and the potential conflict between subscription agreements and the Copyright Act. I then address three approaches (jurisdictional, purposive, and statutory right) that can be taken to determine whether contractual terms are preempted by statutory provisions, and conclude that, in Canada, copyright exceptions are statutory rights that cannot be removed by contract. Finally, I briefly discuss technological protection measures and argue that their recent inclusion in the Copyright Act does not necessarily indicate legislative support for private ordering.
II. Digital subscriptions: Framing the issue
Over the past two decades, academic libraries in Canada have increasingly acquired materials such as journals and monographs in electronic format. Correspondingly, access to these electronic materials is not via ownership of a tangible commodity, as it has been in the past.
Instead, libraries enter into subscription licences -contracts that allow for access to electronic works in exchange for an annual payment.
Physical containers of information (as opposed to the information itself) bear limitations in certain respects that restrict how they can be used: they are rivalrous, in that only one person can use them at one time; there is a certain amount of inherent excludability, in that a user must be in the same physical location as the good; and copying a larger portion of the information (such as a chapter or article) from the good generally takes more effort and expense than copying a small portion (such as a page). When information was housed primarily in physical containers, these limitations likely restrained a great deal of copying, simply because it was difficult or inefficient for a user to go to the trouble.
However, such impediments are reduced if not eliminated in the case of digital works available in a networked environment, where many users can access the information at the same time from any location with Internet access, and make identical copies of any proportion of the work with a mouse click.
From a purely law and economics perspective, the relative ease of copying electronic materials presents a difficulty for copyright owners: what is to stop a subscriber from making a digital copy that could then be used by anyone, making further subscriptions unnecessary? Copyright legislation limits copying to a certain extent, but exceptions to copyright infringement such as fair dealing and fair use provide users with an opportunity to use and share information in ways that can disrupt a publisher's business model.
In response, copyright owners have turned to private ordering in the form of contract law and technological protection measures as a means of controlling access to and use of electronic materials. Subscription ageements will often contain provisions that restrict the amount that one can copy from the work, or the purpose to which the copy may be put. There may a technological limitation on, for example, how many pages can be printed from an electronic textbook. These contractual or technical limitations, however, can conflict with the public domain status of the particular work, or with the exceptions provided for in copyright legislation and interpreted by the courts.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that an effective copyright law is a balance between the ability of the author or copyright owner to earn a reward for his or her creative efforts, and the interest of the public in having the opportunity to freely use the work in a meaningful way: "The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature." 6 Furthermore, in several of its decisions, the Court characterized fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright infringement as "users' rights" rather than mere defences or loopholes. In 2004, the Court explained that these users' rights were essential to the copyright regime:
Procedurally, a defendant is required to prove that his or her dealing with a work has been fair; however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence…. The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user's right. 
III.1 Jurisdictional approach
In both Canada and the U.S., copyright is in the jurisdiction of the federal legislature, and The court can declare "any such right or equivalent right" to be invalid based on jurisdiction. In order for such a "right" to be preempted by the federal statute, it must be the same type of right, without any "extra element" that makes it qualitatively different. 18 For example, in Vault Corp v Quaid Software Ltd, the 5th Circuit held that certain provisions of a Louisiana state law prohibiting the copying of software for any purpose was preempted by the U.S. Copyright Act because it granted greater protection to copyright owners (i.e. prohibiting decompiling of software, which is explicitly allowed in the federal statute).
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Per § 106, copyright owners have the "exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following…" but these rights are "subject to sections 107 through 122" (i.e. exceptions to exclusive rights, including fair use, the practice of which is not copyright infringement The two provisions are not completely equivalent: while § 301 limits copyright (and equivalent rights) to those granted by the Copyright Act, the Canadian section allows for the possibility that the federal legislature might enact additional laws that grant copyrights. However, neither permits the creation of copyrights or copyright-like rights by provincial or state legislatures, or administrative regulators.
The exclusive rights of a copyright owner are set out in s 3(1) of the Copyright Act: "'copyright', in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever…" Section 27 defines copyright infringement: "It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do."
However, certain uses of the work are plainly not infringements of copyright, despite that they are undertaken without the permission of, or compensation to, the copyright owner. These but assignments of copyright or licences must be signed by the owner or agent, otherwise they are not valid (s. 13(4)). Reversionary interest in a copyright devolves to author's estate 25 years after author's death despite any agreement to the contrary (s. 14(1)) Moral rights cannot be assigned, so that any contract or term purporting to assign moral rights would be void (s.
14.1(2)). Certain assignments of copyrights or licences will be adjudged void if they are not registered with the Registrar of Copyrights (s. 57 (3)). Some of these provisions create rights (for example, the exclusive right to assign one's existing rights), and some explicitly disallow the creation of rights, or at least their transfer (for example, moral rights). None of them explicitly allow or disallow the transfer or waiver of users' rights by contract. While "it is not difficult to make a finding that a contract is either expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute", one should only do so if the implication is clear. 28 Like much of the law regarding copyright exceptions, it is necessary to look at the courts' interpretation of the statute.
In without authorization or payment of royalties. As noted above, the exception means that broadcasters do not have the right to prevent such retransmission or seek compensation for it.
The Supreme Court said that were the CRTC to impose its regime, it would be creating a new right in conflict with s 89:
Contrary to s 89, the value for signal regime would create a new type of copyright by regulation or licensing condition…. The value for signal regime would create a new right to authorize retransmission (and correspondingly prevent retransmission if agreement as to compensation is not achieved), in effect, amending the copyright conferred by s 21.
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The dissent, on the other hand, maintained that there is no conflict, because the CRTC has jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act to regulate the conditions under which it will grant a licence. 34 The regime does not create new copyrights, but it imposes conditions on licensing.
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One could perhaps consider this interpretation of the facts as akin to the "extra element" analysis in U.S. copyright law. The majority did not agree, however, calling the proposed regime "functionally equivalent" to an amendment of s 21 granting additional rights to broadcasters.
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While ultimately the CRTC Reference decision prevents an administrative body from imposing conditions granting rights that are functionally equivalent to copyright, and an argument may be made that it would prevent such an imposition by way of a mass-market end-user agreement, 37 it does not directly rule that two parties cannot otherwise voluntarily contract to waive the ability to exploit copyright exceptions. However, the ratio can easily be applied to such an agreement.
In order for the Court to decide whether or not the CRTC has the jurisdiction to enable broadcasters to negotiate with BDUs for compensation for retransmission of signal, it must be the case that broadcasters were not already entitled to do so. In fact, the regime under consideration would not force broadcasters and BDUs to negotiate, it would merely allow private local television stations to choose to negotiate. 38 In other words, it would create the environment for a contract where none existed before.
There is an important difference to consider, however, when applying this ratio to a situation where an academic library freely enters into a licensing agreement for access to electronic materials. Whereas the CRTC Reference case involved negotiations of the conditions under which a BDU may retransmit a signal, subscription agreements address copyright exceptions as conditions under which access to the electronic material is permitted. That is, the waiver of exceptions is a form of consideration, in addition to monetary payment, in exchange for access to the works. In this way, it can be argued that the contract does not create a new right that is functionally equivalent to those found in the Copyright Act, it is merely an agreement to not take advantage of copyright exceptions for the duration of the contract. 37 Pascale Chapdelaine, "The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users' Rights" (2013) 
III.2 Purposive analysis approach
A freely-negotiated contract may not necessarily confer new rights that are equivalent to copyright; as Judge Easterbrook noted in ProCD, copyrights (and other rights conferred by legistlation) are rights against the world, while contract terms bind only those who choose to be party to them. 40 If an individual does not want her fair dealing entitlements curtailed, she is free to walk away from the contract or return the product. The "invisible hand" of the free market, where producers offer their goods for a certain price (monetary or otherwise), and consumers spend what they choose, the market will be guided until it reaches a point where everybody benefits.
However, information, being non-excludable and non-rivalrous, does not easily lend itself to guidance by this invisible hand. Because it can be "consumed" by more than one person simultaneously, and is not lessened with each use, producers will not necessarily make any money from its creation. Copyright law creates articifical exclusion and rivalry in works of information and creativity, encouraging their creation by ensuring some kind of reward for the creator.
In Anglo-American countries such as Canada and the U.S., copyright law is utilitarian -its ultimate purpose is to promote progress in arts and science for the benefit of society as a whole.
This purpose is directly addressed in the U.S. Constitution. 41 Congress is given a constitutional 39 "According to [Cope v Rowlands (1836), 150 ER 707], a finding that a contract is impliedly prohibited requires an examination as to the purpose or object underscoring the legislation" (Still, supra note 28.) 40 de Werra, supra note 23 at 269. 41 supra note 15.
mandate to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" by imposing an artificial monopoly on creative works; the monopoly is limited in order to encourage meaningful use of the works by that will further contribute to progress. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the articles therein and federal statutes are the "supreme law of the land" and take precedence over state laws. 42 Constitutional preemption doctrine has been argued to apply to contracts as well as state laws, and has been used by courts in striking down contractual provisions that disrupt the balance (between the interests of the creator and the interests of the public) 43 created by Congress in enacting copyright law. 44 But it is still not clear in the law whether a purposive approach leads to the preemption of all contract terms that conflict with copyright law, or only those of standard form, non-negotiated agreements.
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Canada's equivalent to the Supremacy Clause is found in s 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982:
"The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
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However, the Canadian constitutional documents do not specify a purpose for the enactment of copyright laws.
As noted in Section II above, Canadian copyright law is considered by Canadian courts to be, as in the U.S., a balance. The approach differs from that of classical economics, where the market is expected to regulate itself. Copyright law is a recognition that some form of governmental 42 ibid, art VI. 43 The House of Representatives report addressing the proposed fair use provision in 1976 stated that "it is the intent of this legislation to provide an appropriate balancing of the rights of creators, and the needs of users. regulation is necessary to encourage creation and use of information and knowledge "goods".
This regulation is backed by policy objectives. In Théberge, the Supreme Court said that
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator…. The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.
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The Court in CCH cited Théberge and added that copyright exceptions such as fair dealing must not be interpreted restrictively, so as to avoid tilting the balance too far in favour of the copyright owner. 48 This idea was repeated in Bell. 49 Indeed, the Governor General, in his Speech from the Throne in 2011, announced the government's intention to amend and modernize copyright law in a way that "balances the needs of creators and users." 50 The Court in the CRTC Reference also noted the importance of the objective behind copyright law:
[A]lthough the exception to copyright infringement established in s 31 on its face does not purport to prohibit another regulator from imposing conditions, directly or indirectly, on the retransmission of works, it is necessary to look behind the letter of the provision to its purpose, which is to balance the entitlements of copyright holders and the public interest in the dissemination of works.
51 47 supra note 6 at para 31. 48 supra note 7 at para 48. 49 supra note 9 at para 11. 50 David Johnston, Speech from the Throne, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, July 3, 2011, online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/the-speech-from-the-throne-1.1057204>. 51 CRTC Reference, supra note 29 at para 70.
The value for signal regime would rewrite the balance between the owners' and users' interests as set out by Parliament in the Copyright Act.
52
Given the insistence that copyright exists to provide limited rights to creators and owners, it would be unusual if not counterproductive to allow copyright owners to defeat its purpose by extending those rights as a condition to access the work. their right to the performance of those duties, unless to do so would be contrary to public policy or to the provisions or general policy of the statute imposing the particular duty or the duties are imposed in the public interest."
III.3 Statutory right approach and privity of contract
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The Supreme Court considered Royal Trust's argument that a statute must expressly prohibit waiving or contracting out of the protections of s 10(1) and did not find it compelling. Instead, the Supreme Court agreed with Potash, and with the appeals court, that "s 10(1) was enacted in the public interest and that the long standing rule against contracting out or waiver should apply to it." 61 However, it did not agree that the renewals in this case represented a attempted to contract out of the statutory right; instead, Potash chose not to exercise the right at this time.
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It has been noted above in Section II that the Supreme Court has, on various occasions, described copyright exceptions as "users' rights". It is important at this point to consider the word "right" and whether it is being used broadly (as a synonym for "interest" or "advantage") or narrowly (as in a "claim") -in other words, whether copyright exceptions can be considered "statutory rights" that cannot be overriden by contract. (It should first be noted that the term "statutory right" as applied to copyright exceptions was used in the CRTC Reference. Rights are futher contrasted with "privileges", which correspond to "no right". A privilege differs from a right in that there is no duty upon anyone else to do something or not do something, but there is also no right in others to make a claim against the individual. A privilege is "permission to do an act that would normally be a breach of a duty." 67 Are copyright exceptions rights or privileges according to the above analysis? It has been argued that American fair use is only a privilege, while copyrights are rights. Fair use does not compel anyone else to do or not do something with respect to the object of the right, which in this case, is the particular use of copyrighted works. It is clear that a copyright owner has a right in rem in the use of her works, and users have a corresponding duty to refrain from using them without permission or compensation. This right is supported in the Canadian Copyright Act by statutory remedies that will legally require the user to compensate for the infringing use, pay other damages, or refrain from using the work. 68 However, this right is limited by exceptions to infringement, such as fair dealing. Within the scope of copyright exceptions, the copyright owner does not have a right. The user, on the other hand is statutorily entitled to make certain uses of a work; by the plain text of the statute, the user has a privilege. If this entitlement were merely a privilege, the copyright owner would, correspondingly, have no right to prevent the use or seek remedy for it. If user rights are "rights" by the Hohfeldian conception, there would be a duty on the copyright owner to not interfere.
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It is sometimes argued that there no right without a specific remedy. In the context of equity, this means that the breach of a right must lead to some sort of relief. An alternative, definitional, interpretation is that the very existence of a right depends on the availability of relief. 70 That is, a "right" must be accompanied by a means of enforcement or other remedy, otherwise it is merely a "privilege" or "freedom". In Black's Law Dictionary, a right is defined, inter alia, as "A legally enforceable claim that another will do or will not do a given act; a recognized and protected interest the violation of which is a wrong. Even where there is no statutory remedy provided for those who would like to enforce their rights, they are not completely devoid of options; a plaintiff may seek declaratory relief from the 68 Copyright Act, supra note 27, s 34(1). 69 The duty may also be on others, if it is a right in rem. 70 court, in order to clarify the respective rights of the parties. 73 There must be a real, not hypothetical, issue to be considered, and a plaintiff with sufficient interest. 74 There need not be any actual wrong or even threat of one; it is enough that there is an uncertainty with respect to legal relations that has the potential to endanger a plaintiff's interests. 75 Although a declaratory judgment does not in itself lead to an award of monetary damages or an injunction, or coercion of performance or non-performance on the part of the other party, it is a res judicata (i.e., legally binding) and will settle any subsequent action by the other party relating to the particular set of facts. 76 A suit for declaratory relief may be impractical for many situations, but matters of practicality (i.e. whether such relief will in fact be sought) are not dispositive to the analysis of whether a freedom is a right.
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There is precedent for declaratory relief with respect to fair dealing in Canada. In CCH, the Supreme Court granted a declaration that the Law Society does not infringe copyright when the Great Library makes photocopies of materials in accordance with its Access Policy. 78 This relief would not be necessary were fair dealing simply a defence to copyright infringement, or a privilege; the Court had already determined that the particular copies under consideration were in fact fair dealing. The order allowing the appeal could have ended there. However, the Court went further and issued to the Law Society a form of positive relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that any copying made within the scope of the library's policy is not an infringement of copyright. This act is in keeping with the Court's characterization of fair dealing as a right that imposes a corresponding duty on the copyright owner to refrain from interfering with its exercise. (Subsequently, York University filed a counterclaim against Access Copyright for a declaration that any reproduction that falls within the scope of York's Fair Dealing Guidelines constitutes fair dealing.
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The above analysis suggests that copyright exceptions are statutory rights that cannot be waived by contract. Although exceptions are not referred to as "rights" in the statute itself, they are implicated as such in the CRTC Reference; furthermore, this is not a necessary condition of a statutory right. There is no statutory obligation upon the copyright owner to facilitate the exercise of an exception, nor to refrain from taking action against it, but a user may apply to the court for a legally binding declaration. is the ultimate user's perspective that is taken into account when determining the purpose of the dealing. 81 DR Jones notes that "'negotiated' agreements supposedly allow the parties to arrive at the terms they bargained for. Yet these agreements do not affect only the two parties. They affect anyone who wants to borrow the work if there is a limitation on lending, and thus they affect a broader public interest." 82 While she was speaking here in terms of access to electronic books rather than use of them (such as copying), the point stands that the legal party to the contract -the party who negotiated and accepted the provisions -is not always the end user of the work. This is especially true in libraries, where materials are collected and maintained on behalf of patrons, who have not signed, and may not be aware of, subscription agreements.
In the Supreme Court decision
In academic libraries, there are two primary classes of users: staff (including faculty), and students. Employment contracts will sometimes specify that the employee has a duty to adhere to all policies emanating from the employer, or it may be an implied term of the contract. Such policies may include a copyright policy indicating that certain uses of copyrighted material, although permitted by the Copyright Act, are barred by publishers' licence agreements. 83 The relationship between a university and its students is said to be one of sui generis contract; the student becomes a party to the contract by accepting the offer of admission, registering for courses, and paying tuition. 84 Documents such as the academic calendar and student handbook are terms of the contract to which students are taken to have agreed, 85 but in many cases copyright is not mentioned in any of these documents (although plagiarism is usually addressed).
University policies may form part of the contract as well.
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However, the proposition that statutory rights cannot be waived by contract applies to employment contracts and study contracts as well as licence agreements. Furthermore, any restriction on a faculty member's ability to exercise exceptions such as fair dealing in their research and teaching may run afoul of a collective agreement. 87 Access to electronic resources is often predicated not only on signed subscription agreements (which may be negotiated) but also on so-called click wrap agreements. The end user agrees, by using the electronic resource, to abide by its terms and conditions. For example, WestlawNext
Canada's Licence Agreement, found behind a link at the login page, defines "Subscriber" as "any person who/which accesses and/or uses the Features and/or data." 88 The User Agreement for the website of The Chronicle of Higher Education states that "You will be legally bound to these terms by accessing or using any part of the site, whichever occurs first." 89 (The agreement prohibits the creation of course books or educational materials using any of the site's content.)
Such an agreement is not likely to be upheld, given the preceding analysis.
IV. Contracts and digital materials
In response to a claim that copyright exceptions such as fair dealing are statutory rights that cannot be waived in contract, copyright owners (and particularly publishers of electronic materials) might argue that the economic aspects of copyright have not been suitably addressed, and that copyright exceptions such as fair dealing are no longer necessary when access to materials is increased. Copyright owners would note that the fair dealing doctrine developed in an age of printed materials and cannot be cleanly imported into the digital environment. Certain uses of a work are permitted in order to ensure access to a work by as many people as possible.
Although the Copyright Act does not address access per se, copyright law is predicated on the assumption that someone other than the author or creator will at some point use the material in some way, even if only to look at it. Fair dealing allows more than one person to have access to a work at the same time; an individual can copy small portions of the material for later reference and leave the physical good for the next user.
This argument comes from a "practicality" and "market failure" perspective of fair dealingthat it is cheaper and more efficient for copyright owners to ignore certain uses of a work than it is to control them or seek compensation for them. 90 In a digital environment, the cost and effort associated with a more thorough control over access to and use of a work is greatly reduced. Libraries will benefit from this regime: for example, there is not necessarily a limit on how many users can access materials at one time; printed materials will not become damaged, nor will they need to be replaced; storage costs are greatly reduced.
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Once access is assured by means of private contracts, there is no longer a need for copyright exceptions. 92 The "invisible hand" will guide the market to an equilibrium that is (economically) beneficial for all.
Critics point out that such a "cybereconomic" theory of copyright does not fully consider the non-monetary factors of copyright policy. Treatment of information as a commodity on par with physical goods ignores or downplays the inherent social worth of information, and phenomena such as the network effect, where the value of a resource increases the more it is used. There is a presumption that scientific and creative progress is better served by private ordering rather than public regulation, but this presumption is simplistic and unproved. 93 99 An academic library's mandate is to support the teaching and research of its college or university, and if a department or faculty requires access to a given publication, the library does not necessarily have the power to "walk away". This, of course, has always been an issue in academic library collection management, but now the issue is not only the price of the material but also the use of it. The pressure to accept overly-restrictive terms has been eased somewhat by the rise of consortial licensing, 100 but publishers raise prices and bundle titles in an attempt to retain power over the acquisitions process. 101 Various commentators have proposed changes to the copyright regime that take into account the new ways of accessing and using digital works. Jane Ginsburg calls this new way "experiencing" rather than "having". 102 She argues that an "access right" is an integral part of copyright, and that copyright owners should accordingly be afforded protection, but that this exclusive right, like others in copyright, should be subject to exceptions and limitations on behalf of users.
Jacques de Werra asserts that we need to find a way to combine contract law and copyright law to address conflicts. 104 He suggests a legal test rather than legislative approach, and outlines the criteria that would be taken into account, much like the factors addressed in a fair dealing or fair use analysis. Copyright law is about balance. It is about a balance between those who wish to purchase items and those who have created items.
Let us say, for example, I am a creator and I choose to sell something that is locked. It is like if my colleague had a store of suits and decided that he would lock the store when there was nobody around. He could choose to lock it or unlock it but if he unlocked the store perhaps people would come into his store and take all of his suits. With that business model, unfortunately, he would go bankrupt.
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While digital locks are similar to a standard form contract in that they (ostensibly) allow a copyright owner to unilaterally control access to or use of a digital work, some of the arguments against the validity of contract provisions that conflict with the Copyright Act cannot be applied to digital locks. The reason is that the digital lock provisions were duly enacted by Parliament and incorporated into the statute. However, the provisions (and versions of them in previous bills) have been criticized in journal articles, books, and blogs as being overly broad, anticompetitive, and possibly unconstitutional. 112 The inclusion of digital locks in the bill seems to suggest that Parliament is supportive of private ordering within the copyright regime. Even if this were the case, the support does not necessarily extend to all uses of a work. The fair dealing and user-generated content exceptions, for example, are not explicitly conditioned on the non-circumvention of a digital lock. The digital lock provision itself does not forbid the circumvention of copy-control protection measures, only access-control measures (although it does forbid any person to "manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide -including by selling or renting -any technology, device or component" if the primary use is to circumvent digital locks). 113 Additionally, the Governor in Council may make regulations that allow circumvention of an access-control measure for the purpose of certain acts, or that require the copyright owner to provide access to a work protected by a digital lock.
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VI. Conclusion
While many in academic libaries assume that contract terms restricting certain uses of digital materials take legal precedence over copyright legislation that permits them, I have argued that the issue is not quite as clear cut in Canadian law. In fact, several arguments can be made that statutory copyright exceptions cannot be waived by contract (whether standard form or negotiated), and even if they could, those whose rights are being waived are generally not a party to the agreement. The purpose of the Copyright Act is to maintan a balance between the rights of the copyright owner and the rights of the user, ultimately benefiting the public via the progress of science and art, and there is no compelling evidence that Parliament intended that this balance should be disrupted by private ordering.
